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I
Suppose that each of the following four conditions obtains:
() You can save either a greater or a lesser number of innocent
people from (equally) serious harm.
() You can do so at trivial cost to yourself.
() If you act to save, then the harm you prevent is harm that would
not have been prevented if you had done nothing.
() All other things are equal.1
A skeptic about saving the greater number rejects the common-sensical
claim that you have a duty to save the greater number in such 
circumstances.
The skeptic that I have in mind is not an amoralist. She affirms the
existence of some moral duties. Nor is she a skeptic regarding the exis-
tence of duties to aid in general, as one might be if one thought that our
duties extended only so far as the imperative to refrain from harming
others and did not encompass an imperative to provide benefits to
others. This skeptic is, for example, happy to affirm that you have a duty
to save the life of a single individual if your only alternative is to save
nobody. More generally, she is happy to affirm the following duty to save
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. In all of the cases I discuss below, it should be assumed that all four of these condi-
tions hold unless I indicate otherwise.
the greater number in cases involving no conflict: for any sized set of
people (including a singleton set) all of whose members you can save, if
you are faced with the choice either to save everyone in this set or to save
everyone in this set plus some number of people outside of this set you
ought to do the latter.2 She affirms that you ought, for example, to save
the lives of both A&B rather than the life of A alone. This skeptic is also
moved by pairwise comparisons of the strength of the claims of each of
two individuals. Hence she is happy to affirm that if you can save either
one person from serious harm (e.g., loss of life) or another person from
harm that is less serious to a nontrivial degree (such as paralysis), you
ought, other things being equal, to save the former from the greater
harm. All of the skeptic’s beliefs enumerated in this paragraph are at one
with common-sense morality.3
What the skeptic denies is a duty to save the greater number from
equally serious harm in cases involving a conflict of interests. She denies
the following: if you can save some number greater than n rather than n
from equally serious harm, then you ought to save the larger set of
people when it does not overlap at all with the smaller set.4 She denies
that you ought, for example, to save the lives of B&C rather than the life
of A if you can either save B&C together, or A alone, and you have no
other options.5 It is her denial of such a duty that constitutes her skep-
ticism about saving the greater number.6 This denial follows from a more
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. This is a “no-conflict case” because saving the greater number does not come at the
cost of saving the lesser number.
. “Common-sense morality” is, I shall stipulate, that which is in full accord with widely
shared intuitions about what one ought and ought not to do.
. This is a “conflict case” because saving the greater number comes at the cost of
saving the lesser number.
. More precisely, she denies that you ought to save B&C on the grounds that they are
greater in number than A. Some such skeptics as John Taurek recommend that you give
each person an equal chance of being saved by, e.g., flipping a coin and saving A if it comes
up heads and B&C if it comes up tails. Taurek would recommend that you save B&C if they
win the coin toss while denying an obligation to save them on the grounds that they are
greater in number. See John Taurek, “Should the Numbers Count?” Philosophy & Public
Affairs  (): –, at pp. –.
. As shorthand, I shall call such skepticism numbers skepticism. Both Elizabeth
Anscombe and John Taurek reject a duty to save the greater number in conflict cases. They
do not, however, necessarily subscribe to all of the claims that conform to common-sense
morality that I have attributed to the numbers skeptic in the second paragraph of this
section. See Elizabeth Anscombe, “Who is Wronged?” The Oxford Review no.  (): –,
and Taurek.
general principle of nonaggregation according to which one’s duties to
come to the aid of others are to be determined by the claims of individ-
uals considered one by one rather than by any aggregation of the claims
of individuals.
The numbers skeptic’s denial of a duty to save the greater number flies
in the face of common sense, and hence there is the temptation simply
to dismiss the view as too outlandish to take seriously. But, as in the case
of other reputable forms of skepticism (e.g., skepticism regarding our
knowledge of an external world, our grounds for induction, or the
freedom of the will), this would be a mistake. We must acknowledge that
the reputable skeptic’s outlandish conclusion is not derived from foreign
premises. Rather it is derived from claims that find a secure home among
the beliefs of non-skeptics and skeptics alike.
In the case of numbers skepticism, the argument originates from a
widely shared unease regarding the propriety of the aggregation of the
claims of different individuals. This unease has been reinforced by 
over thirty years of anti-utilitarian writings in the mainstream of 
moral philosophy. It traces back to Rawls’s complaint that utilitarian
aggregation fails to take seriously the distinction between persons and
Nagel’s defense of an impartial concern for persons that is grounded in
the pairwise comparison rather than the aggregation of the claims 
of separate individuals.7 More recently, Scanlon has defended a 
contractualist alternative to consequentialism that debars any appeal to
the combined claims of different individuals.8 It is not surprising that
these three thinkers share an aversion to aggregation, given their shared
commitment to a Kantian contractualism that calls for the justification
of ethical principles to individuals one by one.9 Yet this aversion is not
limited to those who share their theoretical commitments: Scanlon’s
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. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
), sec. , and Thomas Nagel, “Equality,” in his Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, ), pp. –.
. See Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, ), pp. –.
. In rejecting the aggregation of the claims of different individuals, Scanlon maintains
that it is “central to the guiding idea of contractualism” and “one of the most appealing fea-
tures of such a view” that “the justifiability of a moral principle depends only on various
individuals’ reasons for objecting to that principle and alternatives to it” (ibid., pp. ,
).
own stance regarding aggregation draws heavily, for example, on Frances
Kamm’s noncontractualist deontology.10
Nagel’s aforementioned rejection of aggregation is also, and not coin-
cidentally, a defense of an individualistic conception of equality, which
provides another foothold for the numbers skeptic. John Taurek main-
tains, for example, that the appropriate way to show “equal concern and
respect for each person” is to give each individual in a conflict case an
equal chance of being saved. He points out that an agent who acts from
a duty to save the greater number deprives someone who is not among
the greater number of any chance at all of being saved.11
How might one defend common sense against numbers skepticism?
One strategy would be to try to show that the principle of nonaggrega-
tion does not entail the denial of a duty to save the greater number in
conflict cases. I doubt that this strategy will succeed.12 I shall therefore
consider a different strategy of resistance, one that argues that the
numbers skeptic’s moral commitments as sketched in the second and
third paragraphs of this section are irrational. In Section II, I shall con-
sider the claim that the numbers skeptic’s commitments are irrational
because she cannot consistently hold both that one has a duty to save
the greater number in no-conflict cases and that one has no duty to 
save the greater number in conflict cases. In Section III, I shall argue 
that numbers skepticism is irrational insofar as it gives rise to a 
choice-defeating cycle of intransitive preferences. More precisely, the
combination of the skeptic’s endorsement of the principle of nonaggre-
gation and her affirmation of pairwise comparisons of harms gives rise
to this intransitivity.13
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. See Frances Kamm, Morality, Mortality, vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ),
pp.  and –.
. Recall that Taurek recommends that, rather than always saving the greater number
in conflict cases, one flip a coin to determine whom to save. See n.  above.
. Kamm and Scanlon have both argued that one can justify the saving of the greater
number in conflict cases without aggregating the claims of different individuals. See
Kamm, pp.  and –, and Scanlon, pp. –. I reject their argument in Michael
Otsuka, “Scanlon on the Claims of the Many versus the One,” Analysis  (): –.
. This particular charge of irrationality threatens not only philosophers such as
Anscombe and Taurek who deny a duty to save the greater number in conflict cases. It also
threatens the position of Scanlon, who affirms a duty to save the greater number in such
cases. See n.  below.
These two charges of irrationality presuppose that the numbers
skeptic is committed to one or another of the common-sense claims
sketched in the second paragraph of this section. Hence the numbers
skeptic could escape the first charge by renouncing a duty to save the
greater number in no-conflict cases, and she could escape the second
charge by renouncing pairwise comparisons. She could do so while still
retaining her core belief that one has no duty to save the greater number
in conflict cases. But each move would be highly problematic. In each
case, the numbers skeptic would be driven to embrace an even more
radically counterintuitive claim than the denial of a duty to save the
greater number in conflict cases. Moreover, unlike a denial of a duty to
save the greater number in conflict cases, each of these more radical
claims is unsupported by the sorts of considerations that have generated
widespread moral unease in the case of the aggregation of the claims of
different individuals. They are also unsupported by other moral convic-
tions that have a foothold in common sense.
II
A numbers skeptic, as I have spelled out her position, affirms a duty to
save the greater number in no-conflict cases while denying a duty to save
the greater number in conflict cases. If her affirmation of the former duty
could be shown to imply an affirmation of the latter duty, then her view
would be refuted because shown to be internally inconsistent.
A numbers skeptic might try to argue as follows on behalf of a duty to
save the greater number in no-conflict cases without also committing
herself to a duty to save the greater number in conflict cases. She might
argue that in a no-conflict case you should, for example, save A&B rather
than A alone because saving A&B rather than A is better for one and
worse for none, whereas saving A rather than A&B is worse for one and
better for none. So this case is relevantly similar to a case in which you
can either save A or save nobody: saving A rather than nobody is better
for one and worse for none, and saving nobody rather than A is worse
for one and better for nobody. In a conflict case, by contrast, saving A is
better for one, and saving B&C is better for two. But a numbers skeptic
might offer special reason to reject the aggregation of the claims of two
or more individuals and thereby deny that one has any stronger reason
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to save B&C rather than A.14 She might argue, as indicated in Section I
above, that one should appeal only to the strength of the claims of single
individuals rather than to the claims of groups of individuals in deter-
mining what one ought to do, since the latter would involve the denial
of the moral significance of the separateness of persons and a failure to
show equal concern and respect for each individual.15
I shall show in this section that it is not so straightforward for a
numbers skeptic to distinguish no-conflict from conflict cases. I shall do
so by means of an example that bridges the two types of case. In this
example, each of three people—A, B, and C—will die if he does not
receive medical attention. You have a drug that can save any one of them.
Suppose that you are about to save A. But now imagine that you discover
an herb with which you can mix the drug, thereby rendering it potent
enough to save any two of them. What should you do?
Presumably, the numbers skeptic would not want to say that you may
nevertheless follow through with your decision to save A alone. She
would want instead to say that you ought to mix the drug with the herb
and save two. The following is an implication of the numbers skeptic’s
commitment to saving the greater number in a no-conflict case: it would
be wrong of you to save A alone, since saving A alone is trumped by the
saving of either A&B or A&C. It is trumped because saving A&B is better
for one and worse for none in comparison with saving A alone, as is
saving A&C in comparison with saving A alone; whereas saving A alone
is worse for one and better for none in comparison with saving A&B, and
the same holds when we compare saving A alone with saving A&C.16
But the numbers skeptic would not want to say that you ought to save
B&C rather than A alone. This is because she denies that you ought to
save the greater number in conflict cases.
Is the numbers skeptic entitled to say what it would make most sense
to say about this case: namely, that you ought to save any two—it does
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. The argument on the numbers skeptic’s behalf that I have just sketched would meet
some of the objections to numbers skepticism raised by Gregory Kavka, “The Numbers
Should Count,” Philosophical Studies  (): –, at pp. –, and Jonathan Glover,
Causing Death and Saving Lives (New York: Penguin, ), pp. –. See also David
Wasserman and Alan Strudler’s response to Kavka on the numbers skeptic’s behalf in their
“Can a Nonconsequentialist Count Lives?” Philosophy & Public Affairs  (): –, at
pp. –.
. Taurek advances such an argument against aggregation. See Taurek, pp. –.
. Of course, similar reasoning would condemn the saving of B alone or C alone.
not matter which two? So you discharge your obligation by saving either
A&B, or A&C, or B&C. This would be a disjunctive obligation.
I believe that the numbers skeptic can consistently affirm such a dis-
junctive obligation. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that she affirms
it. She thereby commits herself to the claim that you would discharge
your obligation if you went ahead and saved B&C. But she does not
thereby commit herself to an obligation to save B&C rather than A alone.
And it is only obligations like that, i.e., obligations to save the greater
number in conflict cases, which the numbers skeptic must deny. Such
obligations differ from the disjunctive obligation to save any two rather
than A alone.
But now suppose that it becomes impossible to save A&B, and that it
also becomes impossible to save A&C. Now the only two whom you can
save are B&C. (We shall assume that it remains possible to save any one
of A, B, or C.) Would the numbers skeptic maintain that it follows that
you have an obligation to save B&C rather than A, whom you were about
to save before you discovered that you could save two? If it does follow,
then we will have shown that the commitments of the numbers skeptic
actually imply an obligation to save the greater number in a conflict case.
Hence we will have refuted numbers skepticism.
To avoid refutation, the numbers skeptic must maintain that the elim-
ination of two of the three disjunctive options does not leave you with
an obligation to do that which is specified by the remaining disjunctive
option. It does not leave you with an obligation to save B&C in the case
just described. For the numbers skeptic must, on pain of abandoning her
numbers skepticism, maintain that you are permitted to save A alone
rather than B&C in this case. And if you are permitted to save A alone,
then you are not obligated to save B&C.
It will strike some as a surprising result that the elimination of the two
disjuncts does not preserve the obligation to save B&C. For typically,
when one has a disjunctive obligation, the elimination of all but one of
the disjuncts implies an obligation to do that thing specified by the
remaining disjunct.17 Typically, for example, if one is obliged to do x or y
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. The numbers skeptic’s commitments in the case I have just sketched are surprising
for the following distinct reason. The numbers skeptic would maintain that saving B&C,
while not obligatory, is to be preferred to saving A when the feasible set includes saving
A&B and saving A&C. But she would deny that one must prefer saving B&C to saving A 
and it becomes impossible to do x, then one is left with an obligation to
do y. When you apply for a credit card, you enter into an agreement either
to pay off your balance by the end of the month or to pay interest on
what you have received on credit. If you are unable to fulfill the one dis-
junct of this obligation, then you must fulfill the other. If, that is, you find
yourself unable to pay off your balance by the end of the month, then
you must pay interest on what you have received on credit.
Things are no different in at least some cases involving saving lives.
If, for example, you can save A, B, or C, but no more than one of them,
then you have a disjunctive obligation to save either A or B or C. But if
it turns out that you are unable to save either A or B, then the disjunc-
tive obligation reduces to an obligation to save C.
Why are things different in the case under discussion? Why does a 
disjunctive obligation to save any two in the case under discussion—i.e.,
to save A&B, or A&C, or B&C—not reduce to an obligation to save B&C
when one cannot save A&B or A&C? Why does the numbers skeptic
maintain, instead, that we are left with an obligation to save either B&C
or A alone?
The numbers skeptic can offer the following answer to these ques-
tions: It had previously been impermissible to save A alone because of
the possibility of saving A plus someone else, i.e., the possibility of saving
A&B or A&C. For the reasons offered in the second paragraph of this
section, the numbers skeptic can affirm a duty to save the greater
number in a no-conflict case. But when the possibility of saving A&B or
A&C is eliminated, the numbers skeptic’s reason against saving A alone
also evaporates. This is why she is entitled to say that the disjunctive
obligation to save any two reduces to an obligation to save either A or
B&C. Hence, the numbers skeptic’s commitments do not drive her to a
contradiction in the case under discussion.
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when the feasible set is reduced. This, however, is in violation of the following plausible
principle: “If x is to be preferred to y when they are element of the feasible set S, then x
must be preferred to y when they are elements of the feasible set T which is a subset of S.”
This principle is very similar to a principle of rational choice, which Amartya Sen calls basic
contraction consistency, according to which “an alternative that is chosen from a set S and
belongs to a subset T of S must be chosen from T as well.” See Amartya Sen, “Internal Con-
sistency of Choice,” Econometrica  (): –, at p. . Cf. John Nash, “The Bar-
gaining Problem,” Econometrica  (): –, at p. .
III
In this section, I turn finally to the task of mounting a different, and this
time successful, critique of numbers skepticism. This critique applies to
anyone who is moved, in common with the numbers skeptic, both by
the principle of nonaggregation and by the pairwise comparison of the
strength of the claims of different individuals.18
Suppose that four people have recently been afflicted by a disease that
has paralyzed all of their limbs. These people divide into a group of three
and a fourth person who is distinct from the three. A numbers skeptic
possesses three pills. These pills can benefit these people in the follow-
ing ways:
Each member of the group of three: If he consumes a single pill, he will
have the use of both of his arms restored. Any additional pill will do
him no more good.
The fourth person: If he consumes one pill, he will have the use of one
of his arms restored. If he consumes a second pill, he will have the use
of both of his arms restored. He will have the use of both arms and
one leg restored if he consumes a third pill.
Assuming that she is determined to put all three of her pills to good use,
the numbers skeptic must select one of the following four courses of
action:
(i) Give each member of the group of three a pill.
(ii) Give two of the members of the group of three a pill and give the
remaining pill to the fourth person.
(iii) Give one of the members of the group of three a pill and give the
remaining two pills to the fourth person.
(iv) Give all three pills to the fourth person.
These four courses of action give rise to the following distributions of 
benefits:
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. See Section I above.
What should a numbers skeptic do in these circumstances? I shall argue
below that the skeptic can provide no answer to this question and that
this inability exposes a fatal flaw in her position.
A numbers skeptic believes that one ought, at least when other things
are equal, to give the drug to one person to restore the use of two limbs
rather than to another person to restore the use of one limb.19 Hence, a
numbers skeptic will prefer (i) to (ii). Rather than giving a pill to the
fourth person, restoring the use of one of his limbs, she will prefer to give
that pill to one of the members of the group of three, thereby restoring
the use of two of his limbs.
A numbers skeptic will also prefer (ii) to (iii) and (iii) to (iv). These are,
once again, choices between restoring the use of one limb to one person
versus restoring the use of two limbs to another person. Hence the
reason mentioned in the above paragraph for the numbers skeptic to
prefer (i) to (ii) will also impel her to prefer (ii) to (iii) and (iii) to (iv).
Moreover, the numbers skeptic has an additional reason to prefer (ii) to
(iii) and (iii) to (iv). For in opting for (ii) rather than (iii) and for (iii) rather
than (iv) she would give a greater benefit to someone who would, in
addition, be worse off in absolute terms if not aided than the fourth
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Group of three Fourth person
i.  have  limbs restored He has no limbs restored
ii.
 have  limbs restored, and
He has  limb restored
 has no limbs restored
iii.
 has  limbs restored, and
He has  limbs restored
 have no limbs restored
iv.  have no limbs restored He has  limbs restored
. This follows from the numbers skeptic’s affirmation of pairwise comparison. I
assume throughout this discussion that the restoration of the use of two limbs is about
twice as good for an individual as the restoration of one limb, of three limbs about three
times as good, and of four limbs about four times as good. Those who regard this assump-
tion as unrealistic should imagine other states of mobility and dexterity ranging from
quadriplegia to complete use of all four limbs that bear the same relations to one another
as I assume the aforementioned states bear to one another.
person would be if not aided.20 It is, other things being equal, better to
direct aid to someone who would otherwise be worse off in absolute
terms.21
The numbers skeptic will also prefer (iv) to (i). For in choosing (iv),
she would restore the fourth person’s use of three limbs, and she would
leave three without the use of any of their limbs. By a numbers skeptic’s
lights, such a state of affairs is preferable to (i) in which the fourth person
lacks the use of any of his limbs and three have the use of two limbs. She
thinks it preferable for the following reason: A numbers skeptic thinks
that one ought, when other things are equal, to restore one person’s use
of three limbs rather than another person’s use of two limbs.22 Since a
numbers skeptic is opposed to the aggregating of the claims of different
people, she will not distinguish this case from a case in which one can
restore either one person’s use of three limbs or three people’s use of two
limbs. Therefore, the numbers skeptic will opt for the restoration of one
person’s use of three limbs rather than the restoration of three people’s
use of two limbs. She will, in fact, opt for the restoration of one person’s
use of three limbs rather than the restoration of any number of people’s
use of two limbs.
I have established in the preceding discussion that the numbers
skeptic’s preference ordering is as follows:
(i) > (ii) > (iii) > (iv) > (i).
Hence, numbers skepticism constitutes an irrational set of moral com-
mitments insofar as it generates a choice-defeating cycle of intransitive
preferences. None of the skeptic’s options is justified, since another is
always to be preferred to it. It is therefore impossible to conform to
numbers skepticism in this case.
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. Consider the preference for (iii) rather than (iv). The difference between these two
options is the difference between a pill’s going to someone in the group of three or being
given to the fourth person. If the numbers skeptic elects not to direct her pill to someone
in the group of three (i.e., if she chooses option [iv]), then that person in the group of three
will lack the use of all four limbs. If she elects not to direct this pill to the fourth person
(i.e., if she chooses option [iii]), then that fourth person will lack the use of only two of his
limbs.
. For a defense of this claim, see Derek Parfit, “Equality or Priority?” The Lindley
Lecture (Lawrence: University of Kansas, ).
. Once again, this follows from the numbers skeptic’s affirmation of pairwise 
comparison.
A common-sense aggregator, by contrast, is not faced with such a
cycle of intransitive preferences, since her preferences depart from the
numbers skeptic’s insofar as she ranks (i) over (iv).23 In comparing (i)
with (iv), the common-sense aggregator would acknowledge, along with
the numbers skeptic, that (iv) is in one way preferable to (i): someone in
(iv) would have the use of three limbs restored, whereas nobody in (i)
would have the use of more than two limbs restored. But the common-
sense aggregator, unlike the numbers skeptic, would also acknowledge
that (i) is in another way preferable to (iv): three people in (i), rather than
merely one person in (iv), would receive a great benefit that would rescue
them from the dire fate of quadriplegia by reducing that state to some-
thing no worse than paraplegia. Even though none of the three would be
benefited to as great a degree as the one whose state would be reduced
all the way to monoplegia in (iv), the fact that three rather than one
would receive a great benefit that would rescue them from such a dire
fate would be sufficient to move the common-sense aggregator to opt
for (i) over (iv).24
The numbers skeptic might concede that her principles, unlike the
common-sense aggregator’s, give rise to a choice-defeating cycle of
intransitive preferences in the case under discussion. But she might
respond that there are other cases in which the common-sense aggre-
gator’s principles, but not the numbers skeptic’s, give rise to a choice-
defeating cycle of intransitive preferences. So numbers skepticism is no
worse than common-sense aggregation for that.
Consider the following cycle of intransitive preferences to which a
common-sense aggregator’s principles give rise: An agent is presented
with twenty-six buttons labeled (a) through (z), and she must choose
which one to press. If she presses button (a), then one person will be
spared from suffering an afternoon of the most excruciating pain. If she
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. A “common-sense aggregator” is, I shall stipulate, someone whose views regarding
aggregation are in full accord with widely shared intuitions about what one ought and
ought not to do.
. Scanlon, however, is tempted by the claim that one should not save the greater
number from harm in cases such as this one in which the harm to each of the greater
number, though serious, is less serious to a nontrivial degree than the harm to the one. He
also acknowledges that it is difficult for him to resist this claim, given the individualistic
commitments of his contractualism. (See Scanlon, pp. –.) If he is moved to embrace
this claim, then his view will join the numbers skeptic’s in falling prey to the intransitive
cycle under discussion.
presses button (b), then two different people will be spared from suffer-
ing an afternoon of slightly less excruciating pain. If she presses button
(c), then four different people will be spared from suffering an afternoon
of yet slightly less excruciating pain. If she presses button (d), then eight
different people will be spared from suffering an afternoon of yet slightly
less excruciating pain. And so forth, until one reaches (z): if she presses
button (z), then thirty-four million different people will be spared an
afternoon of the mildest of pain.25
Unlike the numbers skeptic, a common-sense aggregator believes
that if there are two non-overlapping groups of people, one of which is
twice as large as the other, then one ought to save the larger group from
harm, at least when other things are equal. A common-sense aggregator
also maintains, again unlike the numbers skeptic, that one ought to save
twice as many from harm when not all other things are equal and the
harm suffered by the greater number is only slightly less great than the
harm suffered by the lesser number.26 Hence, as between any button and
another button one letter further down the alphabet, the common-sense
aggregator will, unlike the numbers skeptic, always prefer to press the
button further down the alphabet. In other words: (a) < (b) < (c) < (d)
. . . (x) < (y) < (z). Note, however, that the common-sense aggregator also
believes that that (z) < (a): i.e., she believes that it is preferable that one
person be saved from an afternoon of excruciating pain rather than that
thirty-four million be saved from an afternoon of the mildest of pain.27
So the common-sense aggregator is confronted with a choice-defeating
cycle of intransitive preferences in this case.
Now it is not clear upon initial inspection how great a threat this
example poses to the common-sense aggregator. His intransitive cycle
consists of a large number of steps each of which involves a very slight
difference along a given dimension. One might therefore suspect that the
cycle is generated by a mistake that is similar to one or more of the fal-
lacies thought to have been exposed in familiar sorites cases involving a
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. This example is based on an example of Stuart Rachels’s. See his “Counterexamples
to the Transitivity of ‘Better-than’,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy  (): –. See
also Larry Temkin, “A Continuum Argument for Intransitivity,” Philosophy & Public Affairs
 (): –.
. See Scanlon, pp. –.
. The numbers skeptic shares this particular belief with the common-sense 
aggregator.
large number of very small steps.28 Whether or not there is a solution to
the sorites paradox that resolves the common-sense aggregator’s cycle,
there may be a relatively costless and minor revision to the aggregator’s
system of beliefs that will provide an escape from this intransitivity. One
suggestion is that the intuition that it is always better to save twice as
many from a slightly less great harm is based on a mistaken human ten-
dency to discount the moral significance of very small differences in the
benefits and burdens to different individuals.29 This mistaken tendency
might be excisable from the common-sense aggregator’s system of
beliefs without undermining his fundamental moral commitments. By
contrast to the common-sense aggregator’s cycle, the numbers skeptic’s
intransitive cycle does not exploit a repetition of steps involving very
small differences. Hence it cannot be resolved in any of the ways just
suggested.
Even if more thorough scrutiny reveals the common-sense aggrega-
tor’s cycle to be as problematic to him as the numbers skeptic’s cycle is
to her, one does not, however, vindicate the numbers skeptic against an
objection simply by showing that one of her opponents is equally vul-
nerable to a relevantly similar objection. For we cannot foreclose the
possibility that neither numbers skepticism nor common-sense aggre-
gation is immune from decisive objection. Perhaps there is some third
set of moral principles regarding our duties to aid, neither numbers
skeptical nor common-sense aggregative, which is immune from intran-
sitive cycles, and which does not give rise to other, equally embarrass-
ing difficulties. Or it might turn out that no set of moral principles
regarding our duties to aid, either numbers skeptical, aggregative, or 
otherwise, is immune from decisive objection.
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. Temkin, however, would maintain that the common-sense aggregator’s intransitive
cycle is not generated by means of any of the fallacies associated with sorites reasoning.
See Temkin, pp. –. For a general discussion of the sorites paradox, see Mark Sains-
bury, Paradoxes, nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ), ch. .
. Ken Binmore and Alex Voorhoeve offer this suggestion in “Transitivity, the Sorites
Paradox, and Similarity-Based Decision-Making” (unpublished). For defenses of the moral
significance of very small benefits or burdens, see Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, ), ch. , and Michael Otsuka, “The Paradox of Group
Beneficence,” Philosophy & Public Affairs  (): –.
